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SUMMARY 
 
The focus of this dissertation is the impact that the Administrative Adjudication of 
Road Traffic Offences Act 45 of 1998 (AARTO) will have on the employment 
relationship between employers and employees.  
 
AARTO was promulgated in order to, amongst other things; assist with the 
streamlining of the traffic offence administration and the collection of payable fines for 
traffic infringements.  Very little has been written with regard to the implications of 
AARTO on the employment relationship. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to unpack the mechanics of AARTO, and further to 
provide the writer’s view on its impact, problems and possible solutions, of the 
employment relationship within the South African Labour law framework. 
 
The writer will attempt to reconcile the Labour Relations Act and AARTO insofar as it 
impacts on the employment relationship, more especially the termination thereof.  
Writer will set out the provisions of AARTO and the sections pertaining to the 
allocation of demerit points on an individual driver’s licence.  Unfortunately for the 
sake of completeness the writer will deal with the majority of sections in AARTO to 
provide a better understanding of the mechanisms envisaged by the Act to bring 
about the demerit points. 
 
It is writer’s view that dealing with the allocation of demerit points in vacuum will not 
provide the reader with a clear understanding of the impact of AARTO on labour 
relations.  With regards to the actual implications that AARTO will have on the 
employment relationship writer has taken it upon himself to provide a categorization 
of employees in the broad sense and thereafter to discuss the impact of AARTO on 
the different categories of employees.  
 
More over the writer will examine the different categories of dismissal specifically 
misconduct, incapacity and operational requirements as well as the impact and 
applicability of AARTO thereon.  
 vi 
 
The writer will also attempt to deal with peripheral issues that arise as a spinoff or 
AARTO insofar as employment relationships are concerned.  
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In light of the statistics below it is clear that South Africa is faced with a crisis with 
regard to road safety.   
 
The following statistics1 paint a grim picture: 
 
1. From the 1st of April 2007 to the 31st
In light of the above, it is important to look at the objectives of AARTO. These 
objectives
 of March 2008 there were 11577 fatal 
vehicle accidents. 
 
2. In the same period 4283 drivers were killed, 5073 passengers and 5272 
pedestrians respectively. 
 
3. In the same period 279 busses, 244 mini-bus taxis and 1138 mini-busses 
were involved. 
 
4. As far as accident types are concerned, 472 can be attributed to unsafe 
turning manoeuvres, 5182 to pedestrian hit and run accidents and 881 failures 
to stop or yield. 
 
2
                                               
1  Statistics Road Traffic Management Corporation March 2008. 
2  S 2 of AARTO. 
 are: 
 
a) to encourage compliance with the national and provincial laws and municipal 
by-laws relating to road traffic and to promote road traffic safety; 
 
b) to encourage the payment of penalties imposed for infringements and to allow 
alleged minor infringers to make representations; 
 
c) to establish a procedure for the effective and expeditious adjudication of 
infringements; 
 2 
 
d) to alleviate the burden on the courts of trying offenders for infringements; 
 
e) to penalise drivers and operators who are guilty of infringements or offences 
through the imposition of demerit points leading to the suspension and 
cancellation of driving licences, professional driving permits or operator cards; 
 
f) to reward law-abiding behaviour by reducing demerit points where they have 
been incurred if infringements or offences are not committed over specified 
periods; 
 
g) to establish an agency to support the law enforcement and judicial authorities 
and to undertake the administrative adjudication process; and 
 
h) to strengthen co-operation between the prosecuting and law enforcement 
authorities by establishing a board to govern the agency. 
 
It is immediately apparent that the objectives of AARTO (if applied correctly) will lead 
to a reduction of fatalities on our roads as the present unacceptable attitude of South 
African motorists will hopefully cease.   
 
There is therefore no disputing that the objectives and aims of AARTO are noble.  
 
The year 2008 saw the implementation of the provisions of AARTO in the Tshwane 
Municipal District. 
 
Following the implementation of this pilot project, AARTO will be implemented 
country wide during 20093
                                               
3  The Herald 3rd of October 2008. 
. As outlined below, AARTO sets out the administrative 
system to deal with the payment of fines, the making of representations to court as 
well as the consequences of non-compliance with AARTO.  
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Coupled to the administrative function, AARTO further makes provision for the 
allotment with demerit points for traffic infringements and/or offences4.  It is these 
demerit points that are of particular importance to the employment relationship as an 
excessive accumulation thereof will lead to the suspension of an employee’s drivers 
licence5 or operator permit or professional driving permit and the repeated 
suspension will lead to a cancellation thereof.6
 
   
 
It is therefore of particular importance to investigate the impact of an employee’s 
inability to legally operate a motor or any other vehicle as part of his or her 
employment functions. One would therefore have to conceptualize these 
consequences in terms of the labour legislative framework currently in operation in 
South Africa.   
                                               
4  S 24 . 
5  S 25. 
6  S 27. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF AARTO7
 A traffic offence; or 
 
 
2.1 COMMITTING TRAFFIC OFFENCES AND INFRINGEMENTS 
 
In accordance with AARTO, if a person commits a road traffic violation in 
terms of the National Road Traffic Act, No. 93 of 1996, such violation will be 
categorised as follows: 
  
 A minor infringement; or 
 A major infringement. 
 
A traffic offence is regarded as a very serious violation of the law, which 
warrants a major sentence on conviction, such as imprisonment, or a 
substantial monetary fine, or both. Traffic offences will therefore still be dealt 
with in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977), which 
means an offender will be arrested, charged and the case will be placed on 
the role for a hearing in court. 
 
Minor and major infringements mean offences categorised as such in terms of 
section 29(a) of AARTO detail of which is provided in the Regulations.  Traffic 
infringements will be dealt with in accordance with the administrative 
procedures, as prescribed in AARTO. If a person is alleged to have committed 
an infringement, the traffic officer will issue an Infringement Notice.  
 
Infringement notices will initially be written by hand while electronic notices, 
generated by means of hand-held computers used by traffic officers at the 
roadside, will be phased in over a period of time. In the case of so-called 
camera infringements, for example exceeding the speed limit and ignoring 
traffic signals, infringement notices will be electronically generated by the 
                                               
7  https/www.up.ac.zadspacehandle22636002. 
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National Traffic Information System (NaTIS), and served on the Infringer by 
registered mail. 
 
On receiving, through either registered mail or being served in person, an 
Infringement Notice, an alleged Infringer has several choices that he or she 
should comply with within a period of 32 days after having received such 
notice. These choices are the following:8
(b)  Should the infringer still fail to respond to the letter, an Enforcement 
Order will be served.
 
 
(a) in the case of a minor infringement, pay the penalty and qualify for a 
substantial discount, or make representations to the Agency; or 
 
(b) in the case of a major infringement, pay the penalty and qualify for a 
substantial discount (in this case no representations may be made); or 
 
(c)   make arrangements to pay the penalty in monthly instalments; or 
 
(d)   identify the person who was the driver of the vehicle at the time when 
the offence or infringement was committed; or 
 
(e)   elect to be tried in court. 
 
Failure by the alleged infringer to exercise any of the above options within the 
prescribed time of 32 days will result in the following steps being taken: 
 
(a)  A courtesy letter will be served on the alleged Infringer, requesting that 
either payment be made or to exercise any of the other options 
provided, within a further period of 32 days. In such case the discount 
will no longer be applicable, and the Infringer will have to pay the full 
penalty plus an additional fee for the letter. 
 
9
                                               
8  S 17(f) (i-v) of AARTO. 
9  S 20. 
 The Order will demand that payment must be 
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made within yet a further period of 32 days, and in which case the 
discount will no longer be applicable and the Infringer will have to pay 
the full penalty plus an additional fee for the letter as well as an 
additional fee for the order.  Once an enforcement order is served, 
none of the other options provided will be valid any longer. 
 
(c)   Should the alleged Infringer again fail to respond to the order, a warrant 
will be served and handed to a Sheriff for immediate execution.10
Such execution will include seizing and selling of movable property, seizing 
and defacing of the driving licence; removing and defacing of the licence disc 
of the motor vehicle/s; if applicable, seize and deface the operator card of the 
motor vehicle/s of which the Infringer is the registered operator; immobilising 
such vehicle/s; and reporting the Infringer to a credit bureau.
 
 
11
On receipt of such payments the Agency will record the payment received and 
allocate the applicable demerit points for the specific infringement against the 
 
 
2.2 COMPLYING WITH AN INFRINGEMENT NOTICE BY PAYING 
THE PENALTY 
 
Infringers may comply with an Infringement Notice by paying the penalty, as 
reduced by the discount amount shown on the Infringement Notice, to the 
issuing authority within a period of 32 days. Regardless of the place of issue, 
payments can be made at any post office in the country; at any automatic 
teller machine of a bank with which an agreement for this purpose has been 
concluded by the Agency or by registered mail or delivered by courier 
services. 
 
Arrangements may be made with the Agency to pay the penalty in 
instalments. 
 
                                               
10  S 21 of AARTO. 
11  S 21 (1) (a)-(e). 
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name of the Infringer in the contraventions register on NaTIS; and notify the 
Infringer by registered mail.12
2.3.1 REPRESENTATIONS
 
 
(i) of the number of demerit points allocated for the specific infringement; 
and 
 
(ii) the total number of demerit points accumulated to date; and 
 
(iii) the number of points left before his or her driving licence, professional 
driving permit or operator card will be suspended or cancelled. 
 
2.3 COMPLYING WITH AN INFRINGEMENT NOTICE BY 
SUBMITTING A REPRESENTATION OR APPLICATION, 
PROVIDING INFORMATION OR NOTIFICATION 
 
Infringers may further comply with an infringement notice by submitting a 
representation or application, or informing or notifying the agency, in the 
prescribed manner, within a period of 32 days after being issued in person or 
receiving the infringement notice by registered mail. The respective options 
available to the Infringer are more fully explained below: 
 
13
                                               
12  S 18 (8) (a)-(d). 
13  S 18 of AARTO. 
 
 
The infringer will/must submit a representation, only in the case of a 
minor infringement, to the Agency. Such representations are made by 
submitting a sworn statement or affirmation indicating the existence of 
reasonable grounds why the Infringer should not be held liable for the 
penalty payable in terms of the Infringement Notice. The Agency will 
forward such Representations to an independent Representations 
Officer for consideration.  
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The representations officer will consider the representation and may 
conduct an independent investigation to verify facts;14
If the representation is accepted the agency will cancel the infringement 
notice and inform the infringer accordingly of the decision.
 
 
Thereafter he/she may allow the representation, if there are reasonable 
grounds indicating why the infringer should not be held liable for the 
penalty or may reject the Representation if no reasonable grounds for 
allowance could be found.  
 
15
If a representation is rejected the representations officer will provide 
reasons for the decision and may further advise that the infringer may 
elect to be tried in court.
 
 
16
The agency will notify the Infringer of the decision/s of the 
representations Officer by registered mail, upon receipt of which the 
infringer may elect to be tried in court (only if so recommended by the 
representations officer)
  
 
17 or must pay the penalty in full, plus the 
prescribed fee for the representation plus the prescribed fee for the 
courtesy letter, if any, within 32 days or apply for payment of the penalty 
in instalments within 32 days.18
                                               
14  S 18(5). 
15  S 18(6). 
16  S 18(7) of AARTO. 
17  S 18(9)(c). 
18  S 18(9)(b). 
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 2.3.2 PAY IN INSTALMENTS 
 
The infringer may submit an application to the agency that payments 
will be made in monthly instalments. The agency will investigate the 
credit worthiness of the infringer and inform him or her of the outcome 
and the monthly instalments to be paid, should the application be 
granted. The first instalment has to be paid within 32 days after receipt 
of the approval by the infringer. Should the application not be granted, 
the Infringer must pay the full penalty within 32 days after receipt of 
such notification plus the prescribed fee for the application. The 
discount (as indicated in the initial infringement notice) is not applicable 
to payments made in instalments or once an application has been 
received and recorded. 
 
 2.3.3 IDENTIFICATION OF DRIVER 
 
The infringer can provide information, to the satisfaction of the agency 
that he or she was not the driver of the motor vehicle at the time of the 
alleged infringement, together with the full name, acceptable 
identification as well as residential and postal addresses and telephone 
numbers of the alleged driver or person in control of the vehicle at the 
time of the infringement. In such cases the agency will cancel the 
original infringement notice and serve a second infringement notice per 
registered mail to the person so identified.  
 
Should such identified infringer fail to respond in the prescribed manner 
within 32 days, the original Infringement notice will be reinstated and 
the first infringer will become liable to pay both the penalty and the 
prescribed fee of the courtesy letter to be issued in such a case. 
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 2.3.4 ELECT TO FOLLOW COURT PROCEDURE 
 
The infringer must notify the agency of his or her intension to follow the 
court procedure. In such cases the agency will cancel the infringement 
notice and instruct the issuing authority to issue a summons to the 
alleged infringer to appear in court, which will be posted by registered 
mail.19
Such courtesy letter will inform the infringer that he or she has failed to 
comply with the requirements of the infringement notice; and that he or 
she must, within a period of 32 days after receipt of the courtesy letter 
pay the penalty; as well as the prescribed fee for the courtesy letter.
 
 
 2.3.5 COURTESY LETTERS 
 
If an infringer has failed to comply with an infringement notice the 
agency will issue a courtesy letter and serve it on the infringer by 
registered mail.  
 
20
In the case of a minor infringement the infringer may submit a 
representation to the agency or apply to make payments in instalments 
alternatively notify the agency, if he or she has elected to be tried in 
court.
 
 
21
Failure to comply with the above requirements of the courtesy letter 
within the time permitted will result in the issuing of an enforcement 
order.
 
 
22
                                               
19  S 22(1)(a) of AARTO. 
20  S 19(2)(b)(ii). 
21  S 19(2)(b)(i)-(iii). 
22  S 19(2)(c). 
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Should the infringer exercise more than one of the options provided, the 
matter will be concluded without consideration of any of the other 
options. 
 
Without following the issuing of an infringement notice, courtesy letters 
will be automatically generated by NaTIS and served on Infringers by 
registered mail for the following infringements after expiry thereof and 
the prescribed grace period lapsed: 
 
   (a) Failure to renew a vehicle licence; and 
 
(b) Failure to renew a driving licence card or professional driving 
permit; and 
 
(c) Failure to submit a vehicle for a compulsory roadworthiness test 
within the prescribed time frame. 
 
In addition to the applicable fees payable in the above cases, a fee for the 
courtesy letter will be applicable. 
 
2.4 NOTICES 
 
Notices will be issued if an infringer makes an insufficient payment, or the 
cheque used for payment is dishonoured. 
 
Notices will also be served if an infringer who has made arrangements to pay 
a penalty in instalments, fails to pay such instalments or makes an insufficient 
payment on an instalment or the cheque used for payment of that instalment is 
dishonoured. 
 
In the case of: (a) an insufficient payment; or (b) the cheque used for payment 
is dishonoured, the infringer will be notified that the full amount owed, 
including the prescribed fee for the notice, must be paid within 32 days of 
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service of the notice; and failure to comply with the notice will lead to a warrant 
being issued against him or her.23
In the case where the infringer fails to pay the penalty in instalments as 
arranged, or makes an insufficient payment on an instalment, or the cheque 
used for payment of that instalment is dishonoured; the infringer will be 
notified that the outstanding balance of the instalment, including the fee for the 
notice must be paid within 7 days of service of the notice or that arrangements 
must be made within that time for the payment thereof; and failure to comply 
with the notice will lead to a warrant in respect of the full amount owed being 
issued against him or her.
 
 
24
In such cases the following steps will be taken and accordingly recorded in the 
contraventions register on NaTIS:
 
 
2.5 ENFORCEMENT ORDERS 
 
Enforcement orders will be issued if an infringer has failed to comply with: 
 
(a) The requirements of a courtesy letter; or 
 
(b) The requirements of a notice, or 
 
(c) Has failed to appear in court, either: 
  
 (i)  following a traffic offence, or  
 
 (ii)  after specifically electing to be tried in court. 
 
25
                                               
23  S 19B(1) of AARTO. 
24  S 19B(2) of AARTO. 
25  S 20(1). 
 
 
(a) Issue an enforcement order and serve it by registered mail on the 
infringer; and 
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(b) automatic allocation of the demerit points incurred by the infringer for 
the offence or infringement. 
 
The infringer will simultaneously be notified of the number of demerit points 
that have been allocated and recorded against his or her name and the total 
number of demerit points accumulated to date as well as the number of points 
left before his or her driving licence, professional driving permit or operator 
card will be suspended or cancelled.26
The enforcement order served on the infringer will require payment of the 
penalty in full, plus representation fees and the fee of the courtesy letter, if 
any, as well as the prescribed fee of the enforcement order within a period of 
32 days of the date of service of the order; and state that a failure to comply 
with the requirements of the enforcement order within 32 days will result in a 
warrant being issued to recover the applicable penalty and fees.
 
 
27
Until such time as an infringer has paid the penalty and the additional fees as 
required in terms of an enforcement order, no driving licence, professional 
driving permit (PrDP); or vehicle licence disc will be issued to an infringer or in 
respect of a motor vehicle which is registered in the name of the infringer until 
such enforcement order has been complied with or has been revoked.
 
 
28
An enforcement order will be revoked if the infringer applies to the agency in 
the prescribed manner and submits satisfactory reasons why an enforcement 
order must be revoked or the issuing authority applies in the prescribed 
manner for a revocation of the enforcement order.
 
 
2.6 REVOCATION OF AN ENFORCEMENT ORDER 
 
29
                                               
26  S 20(1)(c)-(d) of AARTO. 
27  S 20(3). 
28  S 20(5). 
29  S 20(9). 
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If an enforcement order is revoked its consequences will be cancelled and the 
national contraventions register on NaTIS will be updated. The infringer will be 
informed accordingly and his or her driving licence, professional driving permit 
or operator’s card will be issued or returned, unless he or she has been 
disqualified otherwise.30
If an infringer does not comply with the provisions of an enforcement order 
within 32 days after issuing thereof, a warrant will be issued and handed to a 
sheriff for execution, which will include seizing and selling of movable property, 
seizing and defacing of the driving licence, removing and defacing of the 
licence disc, if applicable, seize and deface the operator card of the motor 
vehicle/s of which the infringer is the registered operator, immobilising such 
vehicle/s; and reporting the infringer to a credit bureau.
 
 
2.7 WARRANTS 
 
31
An infringer may, at any time prior to the execution of a warrant, comply with 
an enforcement order through the payment of the penalty and all applicable 
fees, including the prescribed cost of the warrant, in which case the warrant 
will not be executed.
 
 
32
If a warrant has been executed, the payment of the penalty and fees from the 
proceeds of the execution will be recorded in the national contraventions 
register.
 
 
33
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30  S 20(10). 
31  S 21(1)(a)-(e), (2) of AARTO. 
32  S 21(6). 
33  S 21(5). 
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2.8 ALLOCATION OF DEMERIT POINTS 
 
A person, who has committed an offence or an infringement, incurs a number 
of demerit points ranging from 1 to 4 for any one offence or infringement 
committed, depending on the seriousness thereof.  
 
Demerit points are incurred on the date on which the penalty and fee, if any, 
imposed for the infringement are paid, an enforcement order is issued or the 
infringer is convicted of the offence in court.34
If a person has committed two or more infringements, or is convicted by a 
court of two or more offences arising out of the same circumstances, demerit 
points are recorded only in relation to one such infringement or offence, being 
the infringement or offence to which the highest number of demerit points 
applies.
 
 
35
The demerit points in respect of offences or infringements by operators and 
drivers are recorded separately even if they arise out of the same 
circumstances.
  
 
36  If a person appeals against a conviction by the court for an 
offence no demerit points are recorded unless the appeal is rejected or 
abandoned in which case demerit points are incurred in the prescribed 
manner.37
If demerit points have been incurred by an infringer, such total number of 
points as recorded in the national contraventions register on NaTIS against 
that person will be reduce with one (1) point for every three (3) months during 
which no demerit points were incurred by that person, except for the time the 
 
 
2.9 REDUCTION OF DEMERIT POINTS 
 
                                               
34  S 24(2). 
35  S 24(3) of AARTO. 
36  S 24(3)(b). 
37  S 24(4). 
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court found that the court process had been deliberately delayed by that 
person to obtain a reduction in points.38
If a person incurs demerit points which, when added to the points previously 
recorded against that person in the national contraventions register on NaTIS, 
exceeds a total of twelve (12), that person will be disqualified from driving or 
operating a motor vehicle.
 
 
2.10 PROHIBITION ON DRIVING OR OPERATING A MOTOR 
VEHICLE 
 
39 The disqualification period equals in months the 
number of points by which the total of twelve (12) is exceeded, multiplied by 
three (3).40
A person who is so disqualified must immediately hand in any driving licence 
or professional driving permit to the issuing authority for retention by such 
authority during the disqualification period or must remove the prescribed 
operator card from the vehicle in applicable cases and may not apply for a 
driving licence, professional driving permit or operator card during the 
disqualification period.
 
 
41
Any person who drives or operates a motor vehicle during his or her 
disqualification period is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine 
or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one (1) year or to both a fine and 
such imprisonment.
 
 
42
Upon expiry of his or her disqualification period, a person may apply to the 
issuing authority to return his or her driving licence or professional driving 
permit or to reissue an operator card.
 
 
43
                                               
38  S 28. 
39  S 25(1). 
40  S 25(2). 
41  S 25(3)(a), (b) of AARTO. 
42  S 25(4). 
43  S 25(5). 
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2.11 CANCELLATION OF A DRIVING LICENCE, PROFESSIONAL 
DRIVING PERMIT OR OPERATOR CARD 
 
A person who incurs demerit points resulting in a disqualification to drive or 
operate a motor vehicle for a third (3rd) time, must immediately hand in his or 
her driving licence, professional driving permit or operator card issued in 
respect of that vehicle to the issuing authority.44 Upon receipt of such a driving 
licence, professional driving permit or operator card, as the case may be, the 
authority will take the necessary steps to destroy such licence, permit or 
card.45
Upon expiry of his or her disqualification period, a person may reapply for and 
be issued with a driving licence, professional driving permit or operator card in 
terms of the applicable road traffic laws.
 
 
46
                                               
44  S 27(1). 
45  S 27(2). 
46  S 27(3). 
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CHAPTER 3 
CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEES 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
 
During the research embarked upon for this dissertation it became apparent to 
writer that the impact of AARTO on individual employment relationships would 
be different depending on a number of factors.  
 
AARTO’s impact would vary depending on the employee’s position in the 
company or organisation, the employee’s job description, the employee’s 
designation and the function that the employee is required to perform.  
 
Based thereon employees as a generic term were divided in category A, B 
and C employees. Please note that there are no legal or statutory bases for 
these classes. The classification as done below is to clarify the differing impact 
of AARTO on the broad spectrum of employment relationships.  
 
3.2 CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEES 
 
The three categories are set out as follows: 
 
3.2.1 CATEGORY A EMPLOYEES 
 
Category A employees are employees who are employed for the sole purpose 
of driving.  Such driving may entail the making of deliveries,47 the conveying of 
goods48 or the transportation of passengers.49
 
 
 
Employees employed in this capacity spend the majority of their working hours 
driving either a company or a private vehicle and the driving done forms the 
fundamental function for which they were employed. 
                                               
47  For example UTI, or a similar courier company. 
48  Examples would include Furnisher removers such as Biddulphs or Stuttaford van Lines.  
49  Algoa Bus or Trans Lux. 
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3.2.2 CATEGORY B EMPLOYEES 
 
Employees employed in Category B are not employed as drivers.  However, 
driving forms a part of the function for which they are employed.  Examples of 
such employees would be attorneys who have to see clients and attend to 
court. Estate agents and auditors would also fall in this category. 
 
These employees need to drive to perform the function for which they were 
employed.50
Having classified the different categories of employees coupled to the demerit 
point system as set out in AARTO it is clear that the implications for the 
employer may be far reaching. The impact of the employment relationship will 
most definitely be hampered when an employee is unable to drive. This would 
affect the business continuity and productivity. It is clear that an employer can 
very quickly loose whatever competitive edge it had over its rivals if it does not 
take cognisance of the impact of AARTO.    
 
 
3.2.3 CATEGORY C EMPLOYEES 
 
Employees employed in this category rely on their licences to ensure their 
arrival and departure at the employer’s premises where they perform the 
functions for which they were employed. 
 
Employees in this category do not need a licence in order to perform the 
functions for which they were employed. 
 
                                               
50  Ntsibande v Union Carriage & Wagon Co (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 ILJ 1566 (IC) and Standard Bank 
of SA v CCMA [2008] 4 BLLR 356 (LC). 
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CHAPTER 4 
IMPACT OF AARTO ON DISMISSALS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to the examination of the different grounds of dismissal and the 
relevance of AARTO thereto it is important to discuss the relevance of this 
examination.  In terms of the South African Labour Law coupled with the rules 
of conduct in the CCMA, the bargaining councils and the Labour Court 
disputes concerning dismissals are dealt with in very specific manners.  
 
An understanding of the impact and the relevance of AARTO on the different 
categories of dismissal is important in light of the classification of disputes 
concerning misconduct, incapacity and operational requirements.  
 
The incorrect classification by an employer will lead to a situation where the 
employee’s dismissal might be unfair on procedural and substantive grounds. 
More-over, an incorrect classification will lead to a situation where the 
Bargaining Council or the CCMA and the Labour Court might not have the 
necessary jurisdiction to deal with a dispute placed before it.  
 
As stated previously no examination of this impact had been done therefore 
the following views are done on the basis of the writers understanding of the 
relevant section of labour legislation and case law and the conclusion’s drawn 
are as a result thereof.  
 
4.2 IMPACT OF AARTO ON DISMISSAL 
 
In terms of South African labour law and particular the Labour Relations Act51
                                               
51  Act 66 of 1995. 
 
(hereinafter referred to as the “LRA”), the employer may terminate an 
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employee’s services on the grounds of misconduct by the employee,52 the 
employee’s capacity53 or the employer’s operational requirements.54
Schedule 8 of the LRA, states that incapacity as a result of ill health or injury 
may be of a temporary or permanent nature. If the employee is unable to work 
for a temporary period there is a duty on the employer to investigate the extent 
of the incapacity. If the period of incapacity will be unreasonably long it is the 
duty of the employer to investigate all alternative short of dismissal. Such 
alternatives may include the nature of the job, the period of absence, the 
seriousness of the illness of the injury and the possibility of securing temporary 
replacement for the ill and injured employee.
 
What follows is a commentary on the applicability of the above three grounds 
as grounds for terminating an employee’s services in light of the demerit point 
system governed by AARTO. 
 
4.3 INCAPACITY 
4.3.1 ILL HEALTH 
 
55
In the case of the employee being permanently incapacitated the employer 
must ascertain whether there is a possibility of an alternative position for the 
employee, conversely whether the employee’s duties or work circumstances 
can be adapted to accommodate the employee in his/her disability. While the 
employer is investigating the above possibilities the employee must be given 
an opportunity to state his/her case.
  
 
56
In determining the fairness of a dismissal the degree of incapacity will be 
taken into account as well as the cause of such incapacity. For example 
 
 
                                               
52  Schedule 8 Item 7 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and S 188.   
53  S 188 and Item 9 and 10 of Labour relations Act. 
54  S 188 and Ss 189 and 189A of the Labour Relations Act. 
55  Schedule 8 Item 10(1). 
56  Schedule 8 Item 10(2).  See MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v Matji NO (2007) 28 ILJ 2279 
(LC). 
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alcoholism or drug abuse might necessitate counselling or rehabilitation as 
appropriate steps for an employer to consider.57
With regards to work related injuries or illnesses that lead to an employer’s 
incapacity the courts have indicated that there is a more onerous duty
  
 
58 on the 
employer to accommodate an employee who has been incapacitated under 
these circumstances.59
In determining whether a dismissal that has resulted from ill health or injury is 
unfair one has to consider whether the employee is capable of performing the 
work he or she is employed for and if the employee is not capable, to what 
extent he/she is able to perform the work, to what extent he’s work 
circumstances may be adapted to accommodate him, how his duties may be 
adapted and whether there is suitable alternative work available.
 
 
60
In terms of Davies v Clean Deal CC
 
 
61
The employer should next, after consultation with the employee, ascertain 
whether the duties required of the employee or the manner in which those 
duties are to be performed can be so adapted that the employee is capable of 
 the erstwhile industrial court set out the 
requirements in terms of Schedule 8 as follows:   
 
“The employer must be in the first instance ascertain whether the employee is 
or is not capable of performing the work he previously performed and for which 
he was employed, and if not, the extent to which he will be able to perform his 
former duties. This investigation, in which the employee is entitled to participate 
to the extent necessary to protect his interest, may, in the light of the facts of 
each case, require further medical investigation and opinion and/or the 
employee being asked to perform his former tasks to demonstrate his ability or 
lack of ability … 
 
                                               
57  Schedule 8 Item 10(3). See Naik v Telkom SA (2000) 21 ILJ 1266 (CCMA) 
58  Standard Bank of SA v CCMA (2008) 29 ILJ 1239 (LC). 
59  Schedule 8 Item 10(4). 
60  Schedule 8 Item 11. 
61  (1992) 13 ILJ 1230 (IC) at 1232G-1233A. 
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fulfilling his previous function either alone or with such assistance as is 
reasonable under the circumstances … 
 
The employer must, if the employee cannot be placed in his former position, 
ascertain whether alternative work even at a reduced salary is available within 
the employer’s organisation.” 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that the employer would not rely on this ground 
of dismissal when an employee has reached an amount of 13 points as the 
reason for such an accumulation of points is not related to the employee’s 
health.    
 
The accumulation of points is as a result of the employee committing some 
infringement or offence.  
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
It is therefore the writer’s view that incapacity as a result of ill health would not 
amount to a ground for the dismissal of an employee given that the reason for 
the employee not being able to fulfil his contractual obligation is related to a 
reason removed from his health. Incapacity as a result of ill health relies solely 
on the fact that the employee cannot perform his or her functions as a result of 
deteriorating health or injury.  An employee whose licence is suspended is still 
healthy enough to perform the function for which they were employed.  
 
In the Eskom and National Union of Mine Workers on behalf of Fillisen62
                                               
62       (2002) 23 ILJ 1666 (Arb) 
  case 
the arbitrator held as follows:  
 
“South African law has also taken up the empathetic approach. The incapacity due to 
ill health is not the fault of the employee, and should be tested with great compassion 
before it is found that the employee's incapacity is of such a nature that dismissal is 
justified..”  
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It is therefore clear that as the demerit points are accumulated as a result of 
the actions or inactions of the employee fault cannot be taken out of the 
equitation and flowing there from the notion of a no-fault dismissal will not find 
a foothold in terms of dismissals under AARTO.   
 
4.3.2 POOR WORK PERFORMANCE 
 
When considering a dismissal for poor work performance the employer has to 
determine whether the employee has met a performance standard required of 
him. On the determine that he did not meet this required this performance 
standard the employer has to determine whether he knew or could reasonably 
have been aware of this standard, whether he was given a fair opportunity to 
meet this standard and whether dismissal is the appropriate sanction for not 
meeting this performance standard.63
When it comes to employees who have completed their probationary period 
such employees cannot be dismissed unless the employer has given an 
employee who is not performing to the required performance standard the 
necessary evaluation , instruction, training, guidance or counselling as well as 
a reasonable time to improve. In the event of the employee not having 
improved after all of the above interventions by the employer, the employer will 
have to establish the reasons for the unsatisfactory performance as well as 
other ways short of dismissal to remedy the matter.
 
 
64
 
 
 
One view may be that driver’s performance is coupled directly to the manner in 
which he/she drives.  An indicator of a driver’s driving prowess would be the 
absence of traffic infringements/offences on his/her part.  The argument may 
further be made to state that once a driver has accumulated demerit points a 
process of counselling, training, guidance and instruction may be embarked 
on and the driver given an adequate opportunity to improve his/her 
performance.   
                                               
63  Schedule 8 Item 9. 
64  Schedule 8 Item 8 s 2 and 3. 
 25 
It would therefore flow from this standpoint that once the employer has 
embarked on corrective measures such as training the driver in question on 
the relevant traffic legislation coupled to added driver (K53) training as well as 
giving the driver adequate opportunity to improve, such a driver would in all 
probability become more proficient at his assigned task and possibly negate 
the need to dismiss such a driver. 
 
This is however only the case if the accumulation of demerit points is in fact 
akin to poor work performance.  
 
Given the nature of the Category A employee, one would possibly amplify his 
standpoint by treating drivers in the same fashion as senior managers in the 
sense that their sole function is to drive 
 
Senior managers may indeed have a duty to assess their own performance 
standards and the courts have long accepted that senior employees are not 
always entitled to an opportunity to improve.65
 Stevenson v Sterns Jewellers (Pty) Ltd
 
 
66
The courts have also found that a manager is entitled to receive warnings and 
to be properly informed of any allegations, but the current view seems to be 
that senior managers have both the ability and the duty to monitor their own 
 elaborated as follows: 
 
“But those employed in senior management may by nature of their job be fully 
capable of judging themselves whether they are achieving that requirement. In 
such circumstances, the need for a warning and an opportunity for 
improvement is much less apparent. Again, cases arise in which the 
inadequacy of performance is so extreme that there must be an irredeemable 
incapacity. In such circumstances, exceptional though they are a warning and 
opportunity for improvements are of no benefit to the employee and may 
constitute an unfair burden on the business.” 
 
                                               
65  Basson, Christianson, Garbers, Le Roux, Mischke, Strydom Essential Labour Law  4th ed, 
(2005) 135. 
66  (1986) 7 ILJ 318 (IC). 
 26 
work performance. They are not always entitled to a hearing or an opportunity 
to improve.  
 
The poor work performance of senior managers has been assessed in cases 
such as Unilong Freight Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Muller67 and Eskom v 
Mokoena.68
In A-B v SA Breweries Ltd
  
 
69
In Somyo v Ross Poultry Breeders (Pty) Ltd
 it was confirmed that the senior employee should 
be aware of the performance standards required of him.  
 
70 the Labour Appeal Court 
considered the situation where a senior manager was required to have a high 
degree of skill and even a slight departure from the standard required resulted 
in a serious breach, serious enough to justify dismissal – one error of 
judgement on the part of an airline pilot may have disastrous consequences. 
In this matter the Labour Appeal court elaborated as follows71
All of the above does not change the fact that even senior managerial 
employees have the right to be treated fairly
: 
 
These requirements may not apply in two cases which are relevant to this matter. The 
first is the manager or senior employee whose knowledge and experience qualify him 
to judge for himself whether he is meeting the standards set by the employer ... The 
second is where ''... the degree of professional skill which must be required is so high, 
and the potential consequences of the smallest departure from that high standard are 
so serious, that one failure to perform in accordance with those standards is enough 
to justify dismissal' 
. 
72
                                               
67  (1998) 19 ILJ 229 (SCA). 
68   [1997] 8 BLLR 965 (LAC). 
69  (2001) 22 ILJ 495 (CCMA). 
70  [1997] 7 BLLR 862 (LAC). 
71       at 866C-E 
72       Unilong Freight Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Muller (1998) 19 ILJ 229 (SCA) 
.  
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 CONCLUSION 
 
The counter argument however with regards to the poor work performance 
heading as a ground for dismissal would be that poor work performance (and 
incapacity as a whole) is a “no fault” dismissal.  In light thereof one can argue 
that the accumulation of points is as a result of the employee/driver having 
committed a traffic infringement/offence. 
 
Therefore, there is blame-worthy conduct on the part of the employee and 
further the employee is at fault.  Once this situation occurs, the poor work 
performance ground falls away as it is reserved under the “no fault” heading of 
dismissal. 
 
Hence it is clear that poor work performance would find no application in terms 
of the dismissal of an employee based on an accumulation of demerit points 
and an eventual suspension of such an employee’s licence. 
 
4.3.3 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
In terms of sections 189 and 189(a) of the LRA, the process by which an 
employer can terminate an employee’s services based on such an employer’s 
operational requirements are set out.   
 
At the outset however, it is important to determine the definition of operational 
requirements and such a definition is included in section 213 of the LRA. 
 
 Operational requirements are defined as: 
 
“requirements based on economic, technological, structural or similar needs”. 
It would therefore appear that operational requirements and the need to 
retrench flow from a situation where an employee’s position has become 
redundant.    
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The situation usually arises when the employer finds itself in a dire economic 
situation and is left with no alternative but to retrench certain employees to 
ensure the continued existence of the business. 
 
There has however been case law indicating that in terms of the broad 
definition of economic requirements, an employer may retrench to increase its 
profits. In the Hendry v Adcock Ingram73
In Food & Allied Workers Union & Others v SA Breweries Ltd
 case the following was held: 
 
“If the employer can show that a good profit is to made in accordance with a 
sound economic rationale and it follows a fair process to retrench an employee 
as a result thereof it is entitled to retrench. When judging and evaluating an 
employer’s decision to retrench an employee this court must be cautious not to 
interfere in the legitimate business decisions taken by employers who are 
entitled to make a profit and who, in doing so, are entitled to restructure their 
business.” 
 
Again flowing from this, the excess employees find themselves in a situation 
where their position is no longer needed.   
 
Importantly, as with incapacity dismissals, dismissals on the basis of operation 
requirements are also termed “no fault” dismissals.  
 
74
 
 the no-fault 
issue was explained as follows: 
 
Dismissals for operational requirements have been categorised as ''no fault' 
dismissals - in other words, the employee is not responsible for the termination of 
employment, the effective cause of termination is one or more external or internal 
factors related to the employer's business needs. For this reason, together with the 
human costs of retrenchment, this Act places particular obligations on an employer, 
most of which are directed ensuring that all possible alternatives to dismissal are 
explored and that those employees to be dismissed are treated fairly.'  
                                               
73  (1998) 19 ILJ 85 (LC).  See also Enterprise Foods (Pty) Ltd v Allen (2004) 25 ILJ 1251 (LAC), 
Food and Allied Workers Union v SA Breweries Ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 1971 (LC). 
74    (2004) 25 ILJ 1979 (LC) 
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The situation therefore, where an employer argues that due to its operational 
requirements it cannot have employees who have had their licences 
suspended or who are on the point of having such licences suspended would 
not hold.  
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear from legislation and case law that these employees’ positions do not 
become redundant but the employee will merely be replaced by another 
driver. The driver position he held has therefore not fallen away.  
 
Further, as with incapacity, the reason for the employees finding themselves in 
the current situation is as a result of them having committed traffic 
infringements/offences.  Therefore, there is fault on the part of such employee.  
Hence, as a result of this fault the employees cannot be retrenched in terms of 
a “no fault” dismissal. 
 
4.4 MISCONDUCT 
 
In light of the commentary on incapacity and operational requirements, it is 
clear that the accumulation of points in terms of AARTO is as a direct 
consequence of the conduct of the employee as such points are amassed by 
committing a traffic infringement/offence. Fault can therefore be placed at the 
door of the employee in most instances, subject to nomination of the driver of 
the motor vehicle.  
 
Logically, it would therefore indicate that the dismissal of an employee for the 
accumulation of demerit points in terms of AARTO would happen under the 
ground of misconduct. 
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In terms of Schedule 8, Item 7 of the LRA, an employer can dismiss an 
employee for misconduct once the employer has shown: 
 
1. That the employee has contravened a rule or standard regulating 
conduct in or of relevance to the workplace. 
 
2. That the rule was a valid and reasonable rule or standard. 
 
3. That the employer was aware, or could reasonably be expected to have 
been aware of the rule or standard. 
 
4. The rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer; 
and  
 
5. That the dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of 
the rule or standard. 
 
What is important however is that the disciplinary action is taken against the 
employee based on specific infringements/offences that has resulted in the 
accumulation of demerit points. 
 
Alternatively, the accumulation of such demerit points as a misconduct.  
Therefore, disciplinary action cannot be taken against the actual suspension of 
the licence unless the employer has a specific rule stating that the suspension 
of an employee’s licence is an act of misconduct in terms of the company’s 
rules? 
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4.5 WAS THERE A CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULE? 
 
To determine whether there was a contravention of the rule one would quite 
simply take into account the demerit points obtained. The writer believes that 
no further enquiry would be called for and it would be the employee’s 
responsibility to make the necessary representations if such points should not 
be attributed to his or her licence. 
 
By the accumulation of the demerit points both requirements of mens rea and 
acqus reus have been complied with. The employer might however want to 
safe guard itself against claims in this regard by drawing up a disciplinary code 
setting out misconducts in terms of AARTO.  
 
With regards to category A employees, an employer might argue that 
infringements/offences in terms of AARTO would constitute breaches of rules 
that are “of relevance to the workplace”75. Therefore any demerit obtained by 
a driver is of relevance to the workplace and as such would not entail a 
specific set of policies and procedures in this regard76
A valid rule is one that is not contrary to any law or public policy. An 
unreasonable rule is one that is arbitrary, capricious or unfair.
.  
 
4.6 VALIDITY AND REASONABLENESS OF THE RULE 
 
77
To determine whether a rule is reasonable and valid, one has to take into 
account the employer’s circumstances.
  
 
78
 
  
 
 
                                               
75      Schedule 8 Item 7 (a) 
76      Solomons v Wynland Vervoer (Pty) Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 1308 (CCMA) 
77  Du Toit, Bosch, Woolfrey, Godfrey, Cooper, Giles, Bosch, Rossouw Labour Relations Law 5th 
ed, (2006) LexisNexis, Butterworths.399. 
78  See Metro Cash and Carry Ltd v Tshela [1997] 1 BLLR 35 (LAC); Mathatane v Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ 964 (IC); Dube v Sandton Sun and Towers International [1997] 
3 BLLR 302 (CCMA); Nedcor Bank Ltd v Frank [2002] 7 BLLR 600 (LAC) at para 15. 
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 Grogan79
                                               
79 Employment Law Journal October 1997 'Cracking the Code - Reasonableness of the Rule' 
 had the following to say regarding the reasonableness of the rule: 
 
One is dealing here only with the legitimacy of the rule per se, and not with the 
sanction for contravention. Generally, a rule or standard will pass muster if it is lawful 
and justifiable with reference to the needs and circumstances of the employer's 
business. Negotiated rules will, it seems, be less rigorously tested than those which 
are unilaterally imposed by the employer, particularly if they are embodied in a 
collective agreement. If the rule is found to be invalid (for example, because it is in 
contravention of the BCEA) or unreasonable (for example, because it lacks any form 
of economic rationale), a dismissal for infringing it will be substantively unfair.'  
 
Based on the objects and aims of AARTO the outcomes which it attempts to 
achieve are for the good of society as a whole. One must bear in mind that 
AARTO does not rewrite or create new traffic offences. Therefore an 
employee cannot take exception to an employer including the committal of 
traffic offences/infringements as misconduct. Therefore the rule will never be 
unreasonable or invalid.  
 
One must remember however that the employer will be using what is 
essentially “an objective-subjective test”. The broader impact of AARTO will 
obviously play a major role in determining the validity and reasonableness of 
the rule however the employer’s operational situation (on which only the 
employer can comment) must be taken in account. There can be no doubt that 
employers of category A employees would see a rule to the continued 
operation of its business as reasonable and valid.   
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4.7 EMPLOYEE’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE RULE 
 
To meet this requirement the employer would adopt a specific disciplinary 
policy with regards to offences/infringements in terms of AARTO. Alternatively 
an employer will amend its existing policies to include the requirements of 
AARTO. The absence of rules in this regard does not necessarily mean that 
misconduct is not committed.  
 
The argument is quite simply that one is not allowed to commit traffic 
offences/infringements and it therefore translates into the working environment 
as well. The potential problem however arises where the employer does not 
have a policy in this regard and after the commencement of AARTO starts 
disciplining employees in terms thereof. As employees were never in the past 
disciplined for the committal of traffic infringements/offences, it is possible to 
raise this defence. 
 
Such a defence would not hold much water as AARTO only became a reality 
at a given point and therefore an employer could not implement what did not 
exist.  
 
An employer is therefore urged to adopt policies and practices in this regard, 
alternatively make the employees aware of the implications of AARTO .This 
may be done in a number of ways including supplying employees with a new 
copy of the disciplinary code, memos being sent to employees, emails and 
memorandums on the notice boards.  
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4.8 CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE RULE 
 
Schedule 8 item 3(6) of the LRA states that the employer must apply the 
penalty of dismissal consistently insofar as it has been applied to the same or 
other employees in past transgressions and consistently between two or more 
employees who have been charged with the same misconduct80
The courts have adopted the concept of corrective or progressive discipline, 
the idea being that the employee’s behaviour is corrected through a system of 
gradual disciplinary action including counselling and warning so that the 
employee’s transgression can be highlighted and brought to his attention and 
the discipline meted out against them would prevent a reoccurrence of the 
same offence.
. 
 
Given the fact that AARTO will only become applicable during the course of 
2009 the issue of consistent application of rules in this regard will only become 
relevant subsequent to the first disciplinary action being taken. Employers are 
therefore urged to apply the rules in this regard consistently from the outset.  
 
4.9 DISMISSAL AS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION 
 
81
As a general rule it is not appropriate to dismiss the employee for a first 
offence. If, however, the misconduct is of such a serious nature that it makes 
continued employment intolerable and brakes down the trust relationship 
between the employer and employee dismissal will be justified.
 
 
82
Schedule 8 has included a list of examples of serious misconduct which 
include gross dishonesty or wilful damage to the property of the employer, 
wilful endangering of the safety of others, physical assault on the employer, a 
fellow employee, a client or customer and gross insubordination.
 
 
83
                                               
80 See National Union of Metalworkers of SA on behalf of Du Toit and Atlantis Foundries (2006) 27 ILJ 
1975 (BCA) 
81  Schedule 8 item 3(2). 
82  Schedule 8 Item 3(4). 
83  Schedule 8 Item 3(4). 
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Schedule 8, however, stresses that every matter must be judged on it’s own 
merits and that a dismissal will not be fair if it does not meet the requirements 
of section 188.84
When deciding whether or not to impose a penalty of dismissal the employer 
must not only look at the gravity of the employee’s misconduct but also look at 
the employees circumstances. Such circumstances would include inter alia the 
length of service, previous disciplinary record and the employee’s personal 
circumstances as well as the nature of the job and the circumstances under 
which the misconduct took place.
  
 
85
In Sidumo another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd others
 
 
86
                                               
84  Schedule 8 Item 3(4). 
85  Schedule 8 Item 3(5). 
86       (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) 
 the following 
was added to the list:  
 (i) the importance of the rule that was breached; 
 (ii) the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal; 
 (iii) the basis of the employee's challenge to the dismissal; 
 (iv) the harm caused by the employee's conduct; 
(v) whether additional training and instruction may result in the employee not 
repeating the misconduct; 
 (vi) the effect of dismissal on the employee; and 
 (vii) the long-service record of the employee. 
 
In the discussion of AARTO above it is clear that specific infringements carry 
specific demerit points. The crisp issue revolve around when dismissal 
becomes appropriate for the accumulation of demerit points.  
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It is the writer’s view that the committance of an infringement or an offence in 
terms of AARTO may amount to misconduct. The question further arises when 
this misconduct will amount to a dismissal. As stated in schedule 8 of the LRA 
the legislature prefers a system of progressive discipline. It is therefore clear 
that an employee who commits a minor traffic infringement and accumulates 
for example two points will not have committed a misconduct that would lead 
to his or her dismissal.  
 
In essence an employee will be disciplined as and when the traffic 
infringement/offences occur. In terms of the series of progressive discipline the 
employee might be issued with a warning, second warning, final written 
warning and ultimately a dismissal.  
 
A further question that arises is whether an employee may only be dismissed 
once his or her licence has been suspended. It is the writer’s view that the 
situation is dealt with very much in the same way as incapacity where an 
employee may be dismissed even if he or she have not exhausted their sick 
leave. In the event of an employee committing a major traffic offence that 
leads to immediate suspension and/or cancelation of their licence, it is the 
writer’s view that this single instance would be sufficient to warrant the 
employee’s dismissal.  
 
For a dismissal to be the appropriate sanction in cases of misconduct the 
employer must show that as result of the commission of this misconduct there 
has been a breach of trust.  In the event of the employer not being able to 
show that there has been a breach of trust the CCMA, Bargaining Councils 
and the Labour Court will determine that dismissal is not the appropriate 
sanction. 
 
In Amalgamated Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Grobler NO & Others87
                                               
87 (2004) 25 ILJ 523 (LC) 
 breach of trust 
was explained as follows: 
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Whether there is or is not a reasonable suspicion and breach of trust is a factual 
enquiry and depends on the circumstances of each case…. 
 The mere fact that the applicant does not trust the individual respondents cannot, 
without more, be a basis for holding that the employment relationship has broken. In 
a constitutional democracy implicit in the notion of fair labour practice is the obligation 
to balance the respective interests of the parties. To punish the individual 
respondents with unemployment, even if this is accompanied with some 
compensation, without finding them guilty of any wrongdoing is grossly unfair. The 
breach of trust, if there was such, was not caused by the individual respondents. 
 
The importance of the trust relationship was highlighted in Humphries & Jewell 
(Pty) Ltd v Federal Council of Retail & Allied Workers Union & others88
The situation with Category C employees is conceivably different as the 
employee does not need a valid drivers licence to perform the functions for 
which he/she was employed.  As long as the employee performs said 
 were 
the Spoelstra J stated: 
  
The relationship of trust, mutual confidence and respect which is the very essence of 
a master-servant relationship cannot, under these circumstances, continue. In the 
absence of facts showing that this relationship was not detrimentally affected by the 
conduct of the employee it is unreasonable to compel either of the parties to continue 
with the relationship.' 
  
When it comes to the situation of dismissing a driver (Category A employees 
and possibly Category B employees), the employer will argue that the 
repeated committal of infringements/offences has lead to a breakdown in the 
trust relationship between the employer and employee because in light of 
progressive discipline the employee had been disciplined for committing a 
transgression that has lead to the accumulation of demerit points. 
 
The repeated commission of a traffic infringement or offence has led to the 
employee not correcting his/her behaviour and as such has led to the 
breakdown in the trust relationship.  
 
                                               
88 (1991) 12 ILJ 1032 (LAC) 
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functions, it is not envisaged that such a suspension and/or cancellation of a 
Category C employee’s licence would lead to a breakdown in trust. 
 
The breakdown of trust with regard to Category C employees occurs in a 
situation where an employee arrives late for work as a result of not being able 
to drive.  The appropriate action is taken and in the event of it occurring again, 
further action is taken in line with progressive discipline.  If the situation 
continues, it would arguably lead to the employee’s dismissal.  The dismissal 
and breach of trust is as a result of the employee continuing to arrive late at 
work. 
 
The employee’s defence (if it can be called that) that his/her licence has been 
suspended would in all probability not be considered, as such 
suspension/cancellation is as a result of the employee’s own actions. 
 
De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA89
If the fairness of the sanction of dismissal is tested Zondo JP in Fidelity Cash 
Management Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
& Others
 stated the following with regards 
to dismissals: 
 
“Dismissal is not an expression of moral outrage; much less is it an act of 
vengeance. It is, or should be, a sensible operation response to risk 
management in the particular enterprise. This is why shelf packers who steal 
small items are routinely dismissed. Their dismissal has little to do with 
society’s moral opprobrium of a minor theft; It has everything to do with the 
operational requirements of the employer’s enterprise.” 
 
90
“the Constitutional Court decided in Sidumo that, when a commissioner of the CCMA 
is called upon to decide whether dismissal as a sanction is fair in a particular case he 
or she must not apply the reasonable employer test, must not in any way defer to the  
employer and must decide that issue on the basis of his or her own sense of fairness” 
  highlights the following: 
 
                                               
89  (2004) 21 ILJ 1051 (LAC) at 1058 F-G. 
90       (2008) 29 ILJ 964 (LAC)  
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CHAPTER 5 
FURTHER IMPACT OF AARTO 
 
When one analyses the implications of the Act on the employment relationship and 
the possible termination thereof, a number of further questions arise. 
 
5.1 INFRINGEMENTS/OFFENCES OUTSIDE OF WORK 
 
An employer might be faced with a situation where a driver is extremely adept 
at driving a company vehicle during working hours and as such does not 
accumulate any demerit points.   
 
The same employee however believes himself to be a “Michael Schumacher” 
during his time off and proceeds to take part in illegal drag racing, reckless 
and negligent driving and speeding over weekends.   
 
Such behaviour leads to the accumulation of demerit points.  The question 
then arises as to whether an employer can take action against the employee 
for actions (not specifically misconducts in the employer’s disciplinary code) 
that has happened outside working hours.   
 
Case law has indicated that employees may be charged for misconducts 
happening outside working hours in so far as it relates to work.  For example, 
one employee assaults a fellow employee after work away from the 
employer’s premises.91 A further example is where a South African official on 
a consular or diplomatic mission (as a representative of South Africa) is 
discourteous to those he or she comes in contact with even outside the 
workplace or after working hours.92
The charges would range from assault to bringing the company’s name into 
disrepute.  In light of a traffic infringement/offence the employee might then 
 
 
                                               
91  Van Zyl v Duvha Opencast Services (Edms) Bpk (1988) 9 ILJ 905 (IC).  
92  National Education Health and Allied Workers Union obo Barnes v Department of Foreign 
Affairs (2001) 22 ILJ 1292 (BCA).  
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argue that the infringements/offences were committed outside working hours 
in his/her own vehicle which has no connection with the employer and further, 
if applicable, that such transgressions occurred in another city or province. 
 
Would the employer in those instances, in light of those defences, be able to 
discipline the employee?   
 
It is the writer’s view that in the case of an employee appointed as a driver, 
such transgressions have a direct impact on the employee’s position and the 
functions the employee performs for the employer.  In short, the driver is 
defined as such and driving is the “be all and end all” of such employment. 
 
 PAK Le Roux93
                                               
93 P A K le Roux & Andre van Niekerk The SA Law of Unfair Dismissal 184 
 views the situation as follows: 
  
'As a general rule an employer has no right to institute disciplinary proceedings 
unless it can be demonstrated that it has some interest in the conduct of the 
employee. An interest would normally exist where some nexus exists between the 
employee's conduct and the employer's business. In the absence of such a nexus, 
the employee's conduct is likely to be non-work related conduct or, as it is sometimes 
termed, ''off-the-job' conduct. . . . It is for the employer to establish that it has a 
legitimate interest in the matter which is sufficient to justify disciplinary action against 
the employee.' 
 
The employer can argue that as a result of a driver’s position with the 
employer, there is a duty on such a driver to ensure that his actions outside 
the workplace would not in any way hamper such an employee from fulfilling 
the functions that he/she was employed for.  The same rings true for an 
attorney for example.  A person can only practice if the courts deemed him/her 
to be a “fit and proper person”.  An attorney, who might be the most proficient 
and dedicated representative of his clients, could still conceivably be deprived 
of his right to practice law in light of the questionable actions committed by 
himself over weekends.   
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As discussed earlier with regard to the three identified categories of 
employees, the situation with Category B and C employees, i.e. employees 
who have to drive as part of their responsibilities or who make use of their own 
transport to attend to work would be different in this scenario.  The impact on 
the employees in terms of the accumulation of demerit points does not go to 
the heart of the employment relationship as with a driver.  A driver by its very 
definition has been employed to drive. 
 
Category B and C employees need to drive as an auxiliary function and 
therefore the suspension of their licences will not have the same impact as a 
Category A employee. As such Category B and C employees can possibly 
raise in defence that transgressions happening outside of work do not have a 
direct bearing on the working relationship. 
 
The impact of a suspended licence on category B and C employees will 
however lead to other forms of misconduct i.e. unauthorised absence or 
arriving late for work.  
 
5.2 RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION 
 
As stated previously, the provisions of AARTO will be implemented nationwide 
during the course of 2009. 
 
All persons having a valid driver’s licence will start on zero points and as and 
when transgressions occur, points will be allocated to the person’s licence.  
 
The question however arises as to what would happen if an employer was to 
employ an employee post implementation of AARTO and such an employee 
enters into the employment relationship with a number of points already.  For 
example, an employee is employed during the course of 2009 and such 
employee has 10 points that have been added to his/her licence.   
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The employee is essentially then one or two transgressions away from having 
his/her licence suspended.  If the situation does occur when an employee 
commits a transgression and his/her licence is suspended and the employer 
then wants to take action against such an employee, the employee could 
conceivably raise the defence of Estoppel, in terms of which the employer is 
barred from taking action against the employee as the employer knew or could 
have known about the state of the employee’s points standing. 
 
It could be argued that the duty then rests with the employer to ascertain the 
standing of the employee’s points prior to employing such an employee.  The 
argument can however be taken further to existing employees where an 
employer is aware that employees have committed traffic offences, with the 
consequent demerit points and does not take action to address the situation. 
 
Once the employee’s licence is suspended, such employee can conceivably 
raise the defence of Estoppel in that the employers were aware of the 
accumulation of points by such employees. This is especially the case where 
employees are using company vehicles.  It is therefore of the utmost 
importance for employers to take action against employees to prevent this 
situation. 
 
In terms of Maluti Transport Corporation Ltd v Manufacturing Retail Transport 
& Allied Workers Union & Others94
                                               
94       (1999) 20 ILJ 2531 (LAC) 
  the Labour Appeal Court, through 
Froneman DJP, does allow a defence against Estoppel and states the 
following: 
 
In my view the two basic requirements (there may be more) for a fair renunciation or  
H  retraction of an earlier election would be that (1) a good reason exists for the 
change, and (2) that the other party is given timeous notice of the change so as to 
prevent that party from being prejudiced thereby. Where either one of these two 
requirements are not capable of being met the change of heart will not be given legal 
effect to. 
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It is clear however that the were an Employer knew about the points standing 
and a employee is dismissed the above requirements are not met. 
 
Where it comes to new employees however, the employer would have to 
decide on the amount of points an applicant for a position is allowed to have to 
make him/her eligible for the position. 
 
A further issue that arises revolves around the duty of disclosure that is placed 
on a job applicant.  It is evident that the number of points a job applicant has 
accumulated at the time of his/her application would play an important role 
with regards to the employee’s success in being appointed.  
 
In Laltoparsat and Webber Wentzel Bowens95
As with other disclosures it is the writer’s view that an employer would be well 
advised to ask an applicant as it would be difficult for the employer to 
discipline the employee post facto if the employer did not specifically ask the 
question to a Category B and C employee. It is the writer’s view that there is 
not a duty on the employee to disclose if such an applicant is a category B or 
C employee in light of the Mashava v Cuzen & Woods Attorneys
 the commissioner viewed non-
disclosure as follows: 
 
Non-disclosure, as a ground for vitiating a contract, is a form of misrepresentation by 
silence or omission. It is a material misrepresentation if its omission reasonably 
induced the misled party to enter into the contract, which it would not have done but 
for the misrepresentation. Such non-disclosures, not being direct misrepresentation, 
only become misrepresentation where there is a duty on a party to make such 
disclosures. 
 
96
A further question that that may have some relevance, is whether an 
employee would be able to claim some form of discrimination if he/she is not 
 case. 
 
                                               
95       (2004) 25 ILJ 371 (CCMA) 
96  (2000) 21 ILJ 402 (LC).  
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short listed/employed in a certain position as a result of the points standing 
such an employee may have. 
 
It is the writer’s view that even though the employee might be able to show 
that there is some differentiation between him/herself and employees with a 
lesser points standing, such differentiation does not amount to discrimination 
as it is not on a prohibited ground and in any event the employer would be 
able to argue that such differentiation is as a result of the inherent 
requirements of the job. 
 
5.3 OPERATION OF LAW, STATE ACTION AND SUPERVENING 
IMPOSSIBILITY 
 
A further possible implication of the accumulation of demerit points might be 
the situation where an employer terminates an employee’s (more especially 
Category A employees) contract of employment on the basis of operation of 
law or state action. 
 
It will be the employer’s contention that as a result of the employee’s licence 
being suspended and/or cancelled, the employee cannot fulfil the function 
such an employee had been employed for. 
 
Such a suspension/cancellation is as a result of the operation of AARTO as 
the employee had accumulated an excess of 12 points and the employee’s 
licence has been suspended.  This suspension flows from the provisions as 
set out in AARTO.  Therefore such a suspension of his/her licence is by the 
operation of law. The dismissal is however not by operation of law as AARTO 
does not address employment contracts.  
 
It can be argued that such suspension is also as a result of state action.  What 
this would mean is that the contract of employment comes to an end, but not 
by dismissal in terms of incapacity, misconduct or operational requirements, 
rather on a ground not necessarily covered in terms of the LRA. 
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As a result, there is no dismissal.  As there is no dismissal, the Bargaining 
Council or CCMA would not have jurisdiction to determine the fairness in 
terms of substance and/or procedure.   
 
An example of termination by the operation of law is the Public Service Act97
Case law has however dictated that the employer cannot just rely on this 
proviso to terminate the employee’s services unless the state has made 
certain attempts to ascertain the whereabouts of the employee.
 
which provides that an employee is deemed to have been discharged if such 
an employee is absent from work without permission for a given period. 
 
Again however, the termination does not take place by operation of law as 
AARTO is silent on the impact it has on employment contracts.  
 
98
This is evident form the united association of SA on behalf of Fortuin and 
Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) Ltd
 
 
The argument may be extended in terms of AARTO that an employer cannot 
simply wait for the employee’s licence to be suspended and then rely on the 
operation of law to terminate such an employee’s services without proactively 
dealing with the employee in light of the pending suspension/cancellation.   
 
99
In this case the commissioner found that a situation where Mr Fourie did not 
have a professional driving permit (as the renewal of his permit was refused) 
amounted to a supervening impossibility of performance of which incapacity 
was a species
 case where it was stated that there 
exists a duty on the employer to assist an employee who has been placed in a 
position where he is unable to fulfil his contractual obligations.  
 
100
 
.  
                                               
97  Proc 103 of 1994, s 17(5)(a)(i). 
98  HOSPERSA v MEC for Health (2003) 24 ILJ 2320 (LC). 
99       (2004) 25 ILJ 1142 (BCA) 
100      See also Mhlungu & Another v Gremick Integrated Security Specialists (A Division of Servest            
          (Pty) Ltd) (2001) 22 ILJ 1030 (CCMA) 
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The commissioner believed that there is a duty on the employer in this 
scenario to assist the employee to obtain his PRDT before determining that 
dismissal is the appropriate sanction. The employee was reinstated with no 
back pay and without pay but was given a reasonable opportunity to obtain the 
licence, failing which the reinstatement will fall away.  
 
It is writer’s view that the same process cannot be used with regards to 
AARTO as the period of the employee’s licence being suspended will be 3 
months where after the employee would be credited with one point, possibly 
paving the way for him or her to drive again. If the employee exceeds the 
permissible twelve points by more that one point his licence would be 
suspended by an additional three months for every point in excess. Employers 
cannot be expected to keep employees on there books for a excessive 
periods of time.  
 
This is obviously different from the Fortuin case as Mr Fortuin might be able to 
petition the MEC to obtain these PRDP in able to fulfil his contractual 
obligations. 
 
The argument is also coupled to the circumstances of the particular case 
wherein employers with only one or two category A employees can not afford 
to have employees unable to drive for a minimum period of three months. As 
discussed in the analysis of incapacity herein above it is still the writer’s view 
that the suspension of a employee’s licence is not a incapacity issue as the 
employee has committed a fault and as result the dismissal will not fall under a 
no fault dismissal.  
 
The counter argument is quite simply that the employee is now in a position 
where the employee cannot fulfil his/her obligations in terms of the 
employment contract. 
 
Once this is the situation, the employer will be left with no alternative but to 
terminate the employee’s services, as there is essentially non-compliance with 
the contract on the part of the employee. 
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It is the writer’s view that this approach (at least until such time as the courts 
have given judgement thereon) is the correct approach to follow in terms of 
your Category A and possibly Category B employees. 
 
The employer would safeguard itself against possible claims in this regard by 
including a clause in the contract which reads as follows: 
 
“The employee hereby agrees that it is an expressed provision of his/her 
contract of employment that an employee is in possession of a valid drivers 
licence. 
 
The employee further agrees that in the event of the employee’s licence being 
suspended and/or cancelled in terms of the Administrative Adjudication of 
Road Traffic Offences Act and/or any other relevant legislation, the contract will 
come to an end. 
 
The employee further agrees that it is his/her responsibility to ensure that the 
accumulation of demerits or any similar points in terms of the abovementioned 
legislation be kept to minimum and that any and all transgression, 
infringements/offences be brought to the employer’s attention.” 
 
5.4 LEGALITY OF CONTRACTS 
 
In light of the Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA101 and the Kylie v CCMA102
                                               
101    (2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC) 
102    (2008) 29 ILJ 1918 (LC) 
 cases 
the legality of “unlawfull contracts” against the back drop of prevailing 
legislation was highlighted. In terms of Discovery Health it was found that a 
illegal immigrant enjoys the protection of the Labour Relations Act as 
everyone is guaranteed the right to fair labour practises under the constitution. 
Further, the court held that Discovery Health concluded a valid contract with 
the illegal immigrant. Therefore, the termination thereof constituted a 
dismissal.  
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In terms of the Kylie case the court ruled that as a result of public policy a 
contract for the performance of work prohibited by the Sexual Offences Act103 
was invalid although sex workers would fall into the LRA definition of an 
employee104
In light of AARTO, if a statute renders a specific species of contract illegal and 
a transgression is penalized by criminal sanction three possibilities arise
. 
 
105
                                               
103    23 of 1957 
104    S 213 read with s 200A 
105    Grogan, Workplace Law,(2007) 9th ed 49   
: 
 
1. That the statutory provision absolutely prohibits the formation and the 
performance of that category of contract for example entering into the 
contract for the specific purpose of evading legislation or for criminal 
end. 
 
2. That the provision does not render the formation of the contract invalid 
but merely prohibit its performance for example where an employee 
agrees not to join the trade union. 
 
3. That the provision has no effect on the formation or the performance of 
the contract other that to visit either party with a criminal penalty/. In the 
first scenario such a contract would be deemed void ab initio and there 
are no consequences that flow from its termination. In this second case 
the contract is voidable at the instance of the innocent party, and in the 
third case the contract is valid however the contravening party may be 
guilty of an offence. 
 
Seen against the backdrop of AARTO it would seem that the contracts entered 
into once the employee is not allowed to drive as his/her licence has been 
suspended would fall within the third category. If the employer was unaware at 
the time of concluding the contract that the employees licence has been 
suspended, one could argue that the contract is voidable at the instance of the 
employer.  
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Further more, if the employer knowingly employs the employee to drive and the 
employee’s licence is suspended, the employer as well as the employee might 
be guilty of an offence. However it does not affect the validity of the contract. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
The intended and practical consequences of AARTO are vast.  (some may say 
too vast) In light of the above, it is clear that there is not a single employer out 
there who will completely escape the potential effects of AARTO. This is so as 
there is not a single employer out there who does not rely on automotive 
transport directly or indirectly.   There are only two questions that arise; when 
will the legislation impact on my business and what will be the extent of such 
impact. 
 
It is obvious that employers employing drivers such as bus services or delivery 
services will be very hard hit in the event of their Category A employees not 
being able to perform the functions for which they were employed. 
 
It is therefore clear that employers cannot adopt a “wait and see” approach as 
the distinct possibility exists of employees very quickly being placed in a 
position whereby they cannot fulfil the functions for which they were employed. 
 
For the sake of business continuity alone it is of great importance to employers 
to adopt a proactive approach in terms of dealing with the implications of 
AARTO. 
 
Policies need to be adopted and contracts of employment need to be updated.  
 
Further, employees need to be made aware of AARTO as well as the possible 
consequences of non-compliance there with. 
 
Over and above the legal imperative of having to comply with national 
legislation, employers should view this statutory threat as an opportunity to 
retain their staff.  It is clearly not in the interest of the employer to lose its staff.  
Policies should be introduced to ensure compliance which will in turn make the 
roads of this country a safer place.  Such policies will surely also act as a 
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deterrant and will blatantly set out the consequences of the breach thereof.  
By acting as a deterrent it would hopefully ensure that the employer does not 
have to prevent an employee from driving thereby having to source labour 
elsewhere. 
 
It is a well known fact that it is incredibly difficult to find employees in the 
market with the requisite licenses. It is to be expected that employers would 
want to retain their appropriately licensed drivers for as long as possible. 
 
It is expected that a number of trends may emerge as a result of the 
implementation of this legislation. 
 
The policing of all policies and procedures that may be created may be a 
particularly onerous exercise, depending on the size and type of organization.  
It is fully expected then, that entire departments will come into being in order 
to maintain business continuity. 
 
It was initially expected that there may be an increase in outsourcing under the 
circumstances. Employers have already indicated that this may not present 
them with the solutions initially anticipated.  The reason for this comes down to 
practicalities. The fact remains that there are relatively few unemployed 
persons with the requisite public driver’s permits. One may find that labour 
brokers simply have no one to offer to existing or prospective clients. One 
might, therefore, find an increase in s197 transfers. 
 
As a result of the shortage of licensed drivers, it is expected that institutions 
would emerge offering training to unemployed unlicensed drivers and ensuring 
that existing drivers are compliant with AARTO. 
 
Unfortunately when it comes to the introduction of new legislation, one of its 
greatest challenges is ensuring its implementation and compliance. The 
implementation of AARTO rest squarely on the shoulders of the traffic officials. 
It is important that the conduct of traffic officials will have to be monitored more 
stringently to ensure that they do not succumb to corruption. Given the 
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potential dire consequences of AARTO, drivers who run the risk of not being 
legally allowed to drive may be inclined attempt to bribe officials to let them off 
from an offence. 
 
It is imperative that before any organisation can even begin to grapple with the 
consequences of this legislation and prepare the requisite policy and 
procedure that they themselves are capacitated.  Accordingly, it is strongly 
suggested that all employers be trained as to the consequences of the 
legislation. It will then be for the employer to determine what sort of policy 
would work best for their respective organisation. 
 
Once such training has been completed and such policies introduced to the 
workplace, with due consideration being given to organised labour, it is 
strongly recommend that all staff be educated not only as to the policy, but 
also the consequences of the legislation. The intensity of the training would 
obviously differ and depend on the nature of employment with the employer. 
 
Further regard must be had to the publishing of such policy in the workplace.  
To assist in creating general awareness amongst the employees it is also 
recommended that the employer include general information in the employee’s 
payslips. 
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